This paper examines the overall macroeconomic impact arising from reform in government wages and employment, at times of fi scal consolidation. Reform of these two components of the government wage bill appeared necessary for containing the deterioration of the public fi nances in several EU countries, as a consequence of the fi nancial crisis. Such reforms entailed in some instances, but not always, the implementation of cost cutting measures affecting the government wage bill, as part of broader consolidation packages that typically hinged more heavily on other fi scal instruments, like public investment. While such measures have adverse short-term macroeconomic effects, public wage bill restraining policy changes present the idiosyncrasy that they can yield medium-to longer-term benefi ts due to possible competitiveness and effi ciency gains through their impact on labour market dynamics. This paper provides some evidence of such medium-to long-run effects, based on a wealth of micro and macro data in the euro area and the EU. It concludes that appropriately designed government wage bill moderation could indeed produce positive dividends to the economy, which depend on certain country-specifi c conditions. These gains can be reinforced by relevant fi scal-structural reforms.
Non technical summary
The government wage bill can be broken down into two elements: government employment and compensation per government employee (wages). In the euro area, the government wage bill accounts for almost a quarter of total government expenditure and around 10% of GDP, hence its relevance from a macroeconomic standpoint. Restraint of the government wage bill played a role in the recent fi scal consolidation episode, with actions on this front being part of broader policy packages that typically hinged more heavily on other fi scal instruments, like public investment. These policy measures have to be assessed against the signifi cant episode of stress that affected the public budgets of a number of EU countries during the sovereign crisis period.
Changes to the government wage bill need to be assessed in comparison with developments in the private sector. Regarding wages, the growth per government employee was higher compared to the private sector in the initial phase of the crisis (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) , as the latter was hit more immediately by the economic recession. The cumulative excess was then mostly reversed over 2010-2014 by public wage containment policies, including wage freezes, but also nominal reductions in salaries and benefi ts in some cases. There was substantial heterogeneity across EU countries in the evolution of public wages and employment.
The recent cost-cutting public wage bill measures were mainly driven by fi scal consolidation requirements. It has been argued that these adjustments may have entailed costs in terms of output losses and higher unemployment. However, such adverse macroeconomic effects are largely felt, if anything, in the short run.
Notwithstanding the direct adverse short term macroeconomic effects, there are benefi ts from government wage bill reform that go beyond the objective of fi scal consolidation. Under certain macroeconomic and institutional conditions, a rationalisation of government wages and employment policies can generate favourable labour market effects in the medium to longer term through competitiveness and effi ciency gains. Competitiveness gains materialise through the spillovers effects of public wage moderation on the determination of private sector wages. There is scope for public wage adjustments in the case of positive differentials compared to private wages, which go beyond what could be explained by differences in workers' characteristics, such as the level of education. Effi ciency gains from public employment reform arise when public sector activity partially competes with the private sector (in the production of individual, non-collective public goods, like in the education or health sectors). A decrease in public hours worked to produce substitutable products can lead to the private sector crowding out public jobs. Nevertheless, when public sector activity complements private sector productivity (through the provision of collective goods, like the judicial system), such policies would only affect positively private employment if targetted to increasing the effi cient provision of such public goods.
An important aspect of the debate on public wage bill restraint concerns how long such policies can be sustained over time. In countries where fi scal consolidation needs are still high, recent government wage bill savings would need to be preserved. Additional margins of shortterm adjustment include the moderation of still high public-to-private wages gaps, or a possible continuation of the downsizing trend in public employment, depending on the country specifi c situation. In any case, as regards restraint of real public wages, historical experience shows that catching-up processes in good economic times tend to partially or completely offset crisis related budgetary savings. As regards falls in public employment, a signifi cant portion of the savings observed during the consolidation period hinged on workers with temporary contracts. Thus, the employment adjustment was more of a cyclical-like reaction than a permanent reduction, a fact which is emphasised in this paper.
Finally, the paper argues that reforms affecting public sector personnel are most effective and have more sustained effects when the measures implemented are of a structural nature, beyond those aimed at immediate public defi cit reduction, such as the ones resulting from broad-based ongoing public spending reviews in several EU countries. Structural measures impinge on government effi ciency and thus on overall economy productivity. Some examples are human management/pay reforms, improvements in wage bargaining mechanisms within the government sector, or measures to streamline the size and scope of government.
Introduction
Government wages and employment are the two components of the so called "government wage bill", which accounts for almost a quarter of total public spending in the EU. Public wage expenditure also plays an important role in aggregate demand, as the government wage bill accounts for around 10% of GDP 1 . These fi gures refl ect the importance of the government as an employer: around 20% of the labour force in the EU is employed in the government sector. Thus, the public wage bill is an important consolidation instrument when fi scal rebalancing is needed.
In fact, empirical evidence shows that reductions in the public wage bill are robustly associated with the success of fi scal consolidation episodes. Over the recent period of fi scal retrenchment (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) ) the adjustment of the euro area aggregate government wage bill accounted for 10% of the improvement in the structural general government balance-to-GDP ratio. In any case, there was a large cross country heterogeneity of policy responses regarding government wage bill reductions. Moreover, many governments opted for consolidating strongly through other fi scal instruments, with a particular recourse to cuts in public investment.
It is widely acknowledged in the literature that fi scal adjustment tends to generate direct adverse short-term economic impacts. In the particular case of the public sector wage bill, though, these tend to be milder compared to other fi scal instruments 2 . This is so because the short-term negative impact is mitigated by indirect favourable labour market effects in the medium-term. Public wage moderation impinges on the overall cost-competitiveness of the economy through linkages with private sector wage setting 3 , in particular when positive public private wage gaps 4 are reduced. Moreover, targeted adjustment of public employment may spur private employment 5 .
Sustained containment of the public wage bill is more likely to be achieved and maintained by countries that adopt a wide range of structural reforms beyond measures aimed at immediate public defi cit reduction 6 . Structural measures impinge on government effi ciency and thus on overall economy productivity. Some examples are human management/pay reforms, improvements in wage bargaining mechanisms within the government sector, or measures to streamline the size and scope of government. However, a careful analysis of public sector performance and effi ciency is warranted since some empirical evidence shows that public spending on health and education positively impact economic growth 7 .
1 On data sources and defi nitions see Appendix I. The cut off date for information included in this paper was October 2015. 6 See for instance IMF (2015) and Forni and Novta (2015) 7 Afonso and González Alegre (2011). It must be noted that around two thirds of government wage spending in the euro area takes place in these two areas of government.
This paper reviews and provides evidence on these interrelated issues. The main contribution is the comprehensive set of micro and macro data used to support the analyses (see appendixes I, II and III).
Section 2 provides stylised facts on the role public wages and employment policies played during the most recent consolidation period in the euro area and the EU. It also discusses the supporting role of fi scal-structural policies when governments adopt consolidation measures through their wage bill. Section 3 analyses the possible channels of transmission of government wage bill policies into the economy. Section 4 sets out conclusions and provides key policy messages.
2 The role of the government wage bill in the recent fiscal consolidation episode
This section describes the recent developments of the public wage bill from an aggregate perspective. This includes comparisons with medium term trends (since the early 1980s), with private sector developments, and with alternative fi scal consolidation instruments. Section 2.1 focuses on the euro area as a whole, given the availability of historical aggregates. Section 2.2 turns to individual country data, as the evolution of public wages and employment shows a signifi cant heterogeneity across countries.
Euro area aggregate trends
Until the beginning of the crisis (Chart 1), the aggregate euro area public wage bill as a fraction of GDP had been on a declining trend since the early 1980s. This trend had closed the historical gap with the US ratio by the beginning of the 2000s. The declining trend was only halted with the onset of the crisis, not only because of the fall in GDP (the denominator) but also because of positive year on year real growth rates of government wage bill spending up until 2010. The latter is to a large extent due to the generalised implementation of fi scal stimulus plans in the EU at the beginning of the crisis, under the umbrella of the so called European Economic Recovery
Plan (see Bouthevillain et al., 2009 term perspective, these measures halted the upward trend in relative public-to-private wages witnessed since the beginning of the 1990s (when the gap was smallest, at just over 5%).
As regards employment, total cumulated losses were higher in the public sector over 2007-2014, due to the adjustment in the second part of the period. In historical terms, this was the most signifi cant reduction of government employment in the last three decades. The reduction since the 2009 peak level of public employment was 3.5%, while in the previous episode that took place between 1992 and 1998, coinciding with the run up to the EMU period, it amounted to less than 1%. In fact, from an aggregate euro area perspective, the level of 
Cross country heterogeneity in the evolution of the public wage bill
The evolution of the public sector wage bill exhibited substantial cross country heterogeneity ones that reduced their public wage bills more in real terms. Third, lower real GDP growth rates were associated with higher real reductions in public wage spending.
As regards the type of public goods/services, the wage bill adjustment was evenly implemented between individual and collective ones, as between 2007 and 2013, the ratio between government wage expenditure in individual and collective goods/services remained broadly constant for most countries (Chart 6). Individual goods/services produced by general government are goods that can also be provided privately (according to international experiences), such as health, education and other services, while collective goods/services are typically provided in a quasi monopoly-fashion, and include defence, public order, the judiciary and regulation. The latter class complements private sector production. The former, however, can substitute private sector activity. Thus, the ratio of public wage expenditure in individual goods/services to public wage expenditure in collective good/services is an indicator of the degree of substitution of private activity by public activity 9 . According to the evidence shown in Chart 6, then, the crisis did not signifi cantly impinged on the existing cross country heterogeneity regarding the production of different types of public goods/services. 9 For one approximation to measure the elasticity of substitution between public and private employment, see Fernández de Córdoba, Pérez and Torres (2012a).
OVERALL FEATURES OF THE RECENT GOVERNMENT WAGE BILL ADJUSTMENT IN THE EU

The heterogeneity of policy responses
Measures aimed at containing governments' running costs (operational expenditure) were frequently used among EU countries in the 2007-2014 period, mainly from 2010 onwards.
Government wage bill cost containment measures have been more frequent on the wage side,
given the special status that (some) public sector employees enjoy as regards job security and redundancy (see Appendix III). The most common government wage measures were wage freezes and wage cuts, in some instances. A number of EU governments have implemented policies aimed at reducing staff numbers, particularly those with more strained public fi nances.
The most common measures include new vacancy freezes and limitations on the replacement rate of retired workers.
Overall, public wage bill measures at the euro area aggregate level were limited, amounting to some 0.15% of euro area GDP per year during the 2010-2012 period, while they were negligible from an euro area aggregate perspective (Chart 7). Nevertheless, when accounting for individual country heterogeneity, the picture changes. The average amount of restraining measures implemented by the governments of the countries that actually adopted consolidation policies is much larger than the EU average number. These countries mainly included those under a fi nancial assistance programme (Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Cyprus), Spain, Italy, and Latvia.
Policy measures also targeted the number of hours worked per government employee in some countries, which created room for additional staff adjustments. The impact of these measures can be analysed by using micro data. According to EU SILC data (see Appendix I for
PUBLIC WAGE EXPENDITURE BY TYPE OF PUBLIC GOODS AND SERVICES (individual and collective) CHART 6
SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on COFOG General Government National Accounts data (Eurostat). NOTE: 2012 for Germany, Ireland, Greece, France, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Austria, Slovenia, Slovakia, Denmark, the UK, Romania, Bulgaria, and Malta. 
The wage bill adjustment: temporary or permanent?
Recent public employment and wage policies have been part of a response to the perceived fi scal sustainability risks that increased with the crisis. In adverse cyclical conditions the government budget constraint tightens, and as a consequence different fi scal instruments have to be adjusted. When cyclical conditions become normalised, the need for fi scal adjustment loosens and even a reversal to pre crisis conditions might be expected. Indeed, the historical experience with policies aimed at containing public wage growth shows that they might not end up being of a structural, permanent nature. On the contrary, catching up processes in good economic times tend to counteract the initial government wage bill reduction, either partly or completely.
The most recent experience shows that a signifi cant portion of the public employment adjustment hinged on government workers with temporary contracts. Some insights can be drawn in this regard from EU SILC data, available for the period up to 2012. According to the broader NACE proxy to government employment (OPQ) (Chart 9), the adjustment of employment in government related activities between 2007 and 2012 depended to a signifi cant extent in net terms on workers with temporary contracts, while the number of employees with permanent contracts in NACE OPQ sectors increased over that period of time. In the NACE O sector ("Public Administration") there was a reduction in both the number of permanent and temporary workers between 2007 and 2012, but the latter fell more in relative terms. Country-specifi c studies with alternative data sources confi rm this fi nding 11 . Consolidation measures, as discussed above, have increased average hours worked by public employees and as a consequence may have reduced the need to revert to pre crisis staff levels (temporary hires). Nevertheless, it could be the case that the adjustment of employment witnessed recently ends up being of a transitory nature, as in previous episodes of economic hardship.
STATISTICS ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOURS WORKED PER WEEK (2007-2012)
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR BY TYPE OF CONTRACT (millions of persons)
CHART 9
NOTE: Hours correspond to the number of hours usually worked per week in a main job. Another remark is that it is diffi cult to assess what is or should be the optimal level of public employment of a given country. In fact, the share of public employment vis a vis private employment varies signifi cantly both across countries and within countries over time (Table 2) .
Since the early 1980s a downward trend in the ratio of government to private employment is visible in a number of countries, particularly in those countries with a larger public labour force.
Nevertheless, other countries followed the opposite trend, particularly those with lower starting levels. Against this background, though, the size of the contraction during the recent fi scal consolidation episode seems to be more signifi cant in countries in which public employment followed an upward trend vis-à-vis the private sector in the pre-crisis period. In those countries, private sector employment losses during the crisis were also more signifi cant, which contributed to the tightening of government resources.
The supporting role of fiscal structural policies
Beyond policy actions with a short-term (budgetary) impact (see Appendix III-A), a number of measures of a more structural nature have been implemented in recent years (see Appendix III-B).
In particular, policy initiatives to streamline public administration are encouraging. In addition, some renewed discussion is taking place on policy actions that focus on the substitutability/ complementarity between the public and the private sector as regards public production of goods/services vs. public fi nancing of private provision. The literature claims that sustained reductions in the public wage bill are more likely to be achieved by countries that simultaneously adopt a wide range of structural public sector reforms and/or discretionary wage bill reduction measures. In addition, social dialogue between governments and labour market partners is also highlighted as a contributing factor (IMF, 2015;
MEDIUM-TERM TRENDS IN THE RATIO OF GENERAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (Ng) TO TOTAL EMPLOYMENT IN THE ECONOMY (N)
Forni and Novta, 2014). In previous episodes of public employment reform, measures of this kind were associated with a more contained evolution of the government wage bill following a crisis episode, as the budgetary savings were kept over time. One may also claim that savings were related to the increased effi ciency of the government sector induced by the structural measures.
As regards public wages, policies of a more structural nature include human management/pay reforms, such as tightening the link between pay and performance, or changes in wage bargaining mechanisms within the government sector. A few measures along these lines have been put in place recently, in some cases in the framework of ongoing "public spending reviews". A group of measures are aimed at streamlining the size, structure and scope of government, such as the elimination of redundancies among levels of government, the simplifi cation of procedures or reorganisation of services, and the consideration of alternatives to the public production of goods/services, including the introduction of schemes to publically fi nance private provision.
Based on the micro data evidence supporting this paper, a positive conditional public private wage gap emerges as a structural characteristic of many EU countries (see Appendix II).
In this respect, some policy proposals have been recently put forward to reduce the wage gap. Several theoretical papers (see for example Economides, Philioppopoulos and Varthalitis, 2015a; Gomes, 2014) show that establishing parity between working conditions in the public and the private sectors can be welfare improving under certain conditions. In particular, specifi c policies may be aimed at introducing more job fl exibility in the public sector, or explicitly linking public wage setting to the productivity of the market economy. Other authors (see, for instance, Ujhelyi, 2014) inspect the benefi ts of civil service rules, exploring the conditions under which the existence of tenured "bureaucrats" raises or decreases overall economy welfare. Nonetheless, all these proposals tend to be put forward in abstract terms, i.e. they do not take into consideration the country specifi c heterogeneity observable in the data that is at the root of differences across countries.
The macroeconomic effects of public wage bill reform
This section is aimed at providing some evidence on the possible positive medium to longerterm benefi ts to the economy of using public wages and employment as fi scal consolidation instruments, when compared with other fi scal instruments. We look at these issues taking as
given that a certain amount of fi scal consolidation had to be delivered to counteract a situation of fi scal stress. Contrary to other fi scal instruments, public employment and wages' policies induce spillovers on private sector employment and wages through labour market dynamics. While the focus of this section is on the euro area as a whole, country-specifi c facts are also provided, where possible, based on comprehensive macro and micro datasets.
An overview
The macroeconomic effect of public wage bill restraint is the outcome of a trade off between direct (negative) demand effects and indirect (positive) effects that occur through the labour market. These channels are illustrated in Table 3 , where some quantitative insights are shown on the basis of the ESCB macro econometric models of Lithuania (Celov, 2015) and Spain (Hurtado et al., 2014) . In the two models, public employment is exogenous, but public wages infl uence private sector wages. In both models, in response to a cut in public wages (by 1% of GDP) private consumption and wages fall, while investment and net exports increase. The direct adverse GDP effect is thus mitigated by the increased competitiveness of the economy. Under a public employment shock, the impact on wages is much lower, as it only relates to the increase in economic slack, measured by the unemployment rate-thus the GDP costs are larger.
The possible mechanisms operating to offset the negative short-term macroeconomic impact are explored. A key argument is that public wage restraint may set in motion a labour market adjustment through the inter-linkages with private wages. This is particularly important when public wage policy infl uences private sector-wage setting decisions (e.g. "leadership" or "signalling" role of government wages). Section 3.2 describes how the recent consolidation period has contributed to some competitiveness gains in the euro area, in view of the evidence provided on the partial correction of the public private wage premium. On the other hand, section 3.3 discusses some evidence on the effi ciency gains in the labour market dynamics, based on the complementarity of public private goods and their relative wage compression. It must be noted that the implementation of fi scal structural reforms explained in section 2.5 is also aimed at increasing effi ciency in the public sector.
The competitiveness channel
The facts are that EU countries that were subject to substantial fi scal stress during the crisis were among the ones that cumulated larger competitiveness losses in the pre crisis period (Chart 10). At the same time, though, these countries have corrected part of their imbalances since the beginning of the crisis. The evolution of public wages may have played a role in this correction.
12 In turn, wage setting institutions and practices in the public sector vary considerably across EU countries in several respects, including in particular the role of collective bargaining versus government legislative decision, the degree of centralisation of collective bargaining, or union density, See EC (2014) for an in depth comparative analysis of labour market institutions and practices of EU governments. See also Giordano et al. (2015) . 13 The probability of public wages leading private sector wages is higher in countries where wage bargaining centralisation and coordination is high and where there are high levels of union membership, while it is weaker when there is greater openness to trade or wage indexation (Lamo, Pérez, and Sánchez-Fuentes, 2013).
THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC WAGE AND EMPLOYMENT SHOCKS IN TWO MACRO-ECONOMIC MODELS (FOR LITHUANIA AND SPAIN)
be an indirect effect from public wages on ULC by setting in motion benefi cial labour market dynamics. It is diffi cult to assess, however, to what extent private wage developments in recent years may have been infl uenced by those in the general government sector.
The existence of distortions in public private wage gaps (see Appendix II for a detailed explanation and quantifi cation) can be particularly harmful for competitiveness given that public sector activities are concentrated in non tradable sectors, which are less exposed to international competition. The wage gap is estimated to rise after controlling for workers' characteristics and stems mainly from differences between workers' wages at the low end of the wage distribution. As an example, for the euro area and the group of non-euro area countries shown, the wage premium is estimated to be positive for workers in the lower 10% quantile of the wage distribution, and turns negative in the top 10% (90% quantile) (Chart 12).
There is evidence that the recent public wage restraint has driven the partial correction of the existing positive public-private wage premium in the euro area. Macro (aggregate) data CY  ES  LU  IE  IT  PT  LT  FS  PL  GR  CZ  AT  UK  EA  SI  SK  NL  BE  HU  EE  FR  DE  NO  DK  SE  LV  IS   Quantile 90 dots in both panels) 15 . In fact, most of the countries have smaller or negative public private wage differentials in quantile 90 of the income distribution, than at the lower end of the wage distribution (quantile 10).
The dynamics of the gap during the crisis refl ect the different behaviour of wages and hours worked in the public and the private sectors. Wages per hour worked grew much faster in the private than in the government sector over 2007-2012 for the pools of euro area and non-euro area EU countries. On the individual country level, wage per hour growth was higher in the private sector in 15 out of the 23 individual EU countries studied, refl ecting the generalised implementation of cost containment policies in the public sector over that period, most notably since 2010. In particular, there was an increase in hours worked in a typical week for employees in government related activities (particularly in countries under fi scal stress). Data for the private sector indicate an opposite trend.
The sectorial structure of the country, between tradable goods and services and nontradable sectors, may also be instrumental to understanding the public pay gap (Chart 13).
Indeed, compared to the baseline estimated wage premium, the "Scandinavian model" seems to operate partially, as public private wage gaps are reduced when public wages are compared to wages in the tradable sectors, instead of those in the overall private sector delimitation used before (all sectors except OPQ). In particular, the premiums of Belgium, Germany, and the UK turn negative, while that of France becomes more negative. In general premiums with respect to the tradable sector are lower, even though there are exceptions.
The efficiency channel
The assessment of the effi ciency of labour market fl ows provided here is based on two concepts:
the complementarity between public and private employment, and the wage dispersion in the public vis à vis the private sector.
The size and strength of the impact of reductions in public employment mainly depends on the degree of complementarity between the public and private sectors. Government activity complements private sector activity through the provision of collective goods/services (like the judicial system), while at the same time partially competes with (substitutes) the private sector in a number of sectors (like education or health). A decrease in public jobs in sectors that produce highly substitutable products can directly spur private jobs. However, in sectors in which public and private production complement each other, there exists the possibility that a reduction in public employment negatively affects private sector employment, if public production positively affects the marginal product of labour in the private sector (see Maley and Moutos, 1996; Algan et al., 2002) .
15 In the former case, the lower 10% premium moved from 0.19 in 2007 to 0.14 in 2012, while in the upper 10% the wage premium decreased from 0.00 to -0.03. For a number of countries, though, the change by quantiles went in opposite directions, refl ecting in some cases policy measures aimed at reducing wage differentials within the government sector or targeting certain groups of public workers. However, at the upper end of the wage distribution, the literature shows that the premium may refl ect more the impact of characteristics whereas at the lower end it refl ects unobserved characteristics. 
THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE SECTOR PAY GAP: TRADABLE VERSUS NON-TRADABLE SECTORS
PT EE LT LV AT ES SK NL HU IT CZ GR DK IE IS EA PL UK SI SE FR BE DE CY LU NO
The empirical literature tends to fi nd that public employment crowd-out private sector
employment. An increase in vacancies in the public sector causes labour fl ows from the private to the public sector if a positive public-private wage gap exists. This leads to an increase in private sector wages and a potential reduction of private sector employment (Stepanyan and Leigh, 2015) . The dependence on the degree of public private substitutability is exemplifi ed by means of simulations of a smal-scaled DSGE model for the euro area (Chart 14). The model encompasses a positive public-private wage gap and an aggregate production function in which output is produced by combining public and private employment. The elasticity of substitution between public and private employment modulates the degree of complementarity in production of the two inputs. The shock consists of an increase in the public sector wage bill implemented through an increase in public wages and in public employment by about the same proportion.
This increase in the public wage bill is self-fi nanced by an increase in the income tax rate 16 .
A second factor in determining the economic incentives inducing people to enter or leave a sector, is the relative wage dispersion, i.e. the shape of the wage structure. It has been argued that the public sector fi nds it more diffi cult to attract and retain highly skilled workers as a result of a relatively higher wage compression (see e.g. the seminal work of Borjas, 1993) . In the case of the euro area pool, according to EU-SILC data, the distribution of 
RESPONSE TO A PUBLIC WAGE BILL (POSITIVE) SHOCK IN A SMALL-SCALE DSGE MODEL CALIBRATED FOR THE EURO AREA
Policy discussion
Well designed government wages and employment policies and reforms may generate overall economy competitiveness gains and increase the effi ciency of the labour market. In times of fi scal stress, public employment adjustments can affect GDP and total economy employment positively if there are large ineffi ciencies in the government sector and/or there is high substitutability between private and public sector output. Public wage policies can have benefi cial effects on competitiveness if they are targeted to infl uence overall economy wage moderation (via "wage leadership"). In addition, if a public pay gap exists, the latter positive effect of public wage restraint becomes amplifi ed as labour market ineffi ciencies are also reduced, provided policies are correctly designed.
While public sector demand across the euro area is needed in the current circumstances to support economic growth, in some countries fi scal consolidation needs are still high, and recent government wage bill savings are to be preserved. When cyclical conditions become normalised, the need for fi scal prudence loosens, not least given that public employment and wages tend to follow lagged pro cyclical patterns, as pointed out by the available literature (see e.g. Lamo, Pérez, and Schuknecht, 2013a).
As regards public wage containment, historical experience shows that catching-up processes in good economic times tend to partially or completely cancel out crisis-related budgetary savings. As regards public employment, analysis based on micro data shows that, in many countries, a signifi cant portion of the reduction depended on workers with temporary contracts. Thus, the employment adjustment was more of a cyclical-like reaction than a permanent reduction. Additional margins of short-term adjustment include the moderation of high public-to-private wages ratios (the "wage gap").
Moreover, many countries have recently embarked on fi sca-structural reforms, geared towards increasing effi ciency in the public sector, which in turn are likely to support the public wage moderation achieved and help to counteract the risks of policy reversal.
Overall, further adjustment of the government wage bill has to be designed carefully and with regard to country specifi c circumstances. Margins for possible further public wage and employment retrenchment have to take into account the particular country-related conditions.
This includes the consolidation effort and structural reforms already accomplished, and the effi cient provision of public goods and services, including the preservation of a high level of human capital.
Appendix I Definitions and data used
In advanced OECD economies, the government is widely involved in the provision of welfare services (mainly health and education) and utilities. This means that its presence in the economy goes well beyond the provision of pure public goods and services. The specifi c form of the provision of welfare services varies signifi cantly across countries, i.e. whether it consists of direct service delivery, partial delivery and/or partial/full subsidisation of consumption. These alternatives imply a different role for non governmental organisations, and thus translate into signifi cant heterogeneity across countries in the number of public sector employees in those sectors. For a cross country study, it is important to acknowledge upfront that it is very diffi cult
DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYMENT BY SECTOR: SPAIN AND DENMARK
to delineate the precise nature of the public sector. For example, according to Eurofound (2015) services in the health systems in Germany, France and the Benelux countries, while largely statefunded, are provided mainly by private sector companies or mixed-ownership organisations.
The heterogeneity in the direct involvement of the public sector in the different sectors of the economy might be illustrated by considering the distribution of employees in the general government, public enterprises and the private sector (for the cases of Denmark and Spain and, to some extent, France). In Denmark the number of general government employees in the health and education sectors is close to 90% and more than 80%, respectively. In contrast, in Spain the percentages are about 50% and 60%, respectively. In addition, the involvement of the public sector (directly or via public enterprises) in the transportation and storage and utilities sectors is quite different between the two countries. It is worth mentioning that the selection of just a few countries is not only for the sake of brevity, but mainly due to diffi culties in fi nding publicly available, cross-country homogeneous datasets on which to base a broader analysis.
In this regard, in order to analyse the activity of the government as an employer, it is necessary to make use of different partial data sources, as no single source guarantees comprehensive coverage of the total number of public employees in terms of institutional sector coverage, characteristics (including wages), and homogeneity of defi nitions.
As regards macro (aggregate) data, the focus is on the general government sector is also used. This makes it possible to analyse the general government sector wage bill expenditure broken down into individual and collective goods and services. Individual services ("merit goods", see e.g. Fiorito and Kollintzas, 2004) , are characterised by the fact that they can also be provided privately, such as health, education and other services, while collective goods (traditional "public goods") are non-rival substitutes for private consumption. In particular, we proxy individual services by aggregating the functions of health, education and social protection, and collective services by aggregating the remaining seven COFOG categories, namely general services, defence, public order and safety, economic affairs, environment, housing, and recreation.
As regards sources of micro data, the selected database is the European Union Statistics . On related grounds, it is argued that a wage premium arises because of differences in the bargaining power of private and public sector workers (Holmlund, 1997) . Other explanations are linked to countries' degree of fi scal decentralisation. In this regard it has been argued that public expenditure decentralisation tends to be related to the presence of higher overall public wage premiums, because of common pool problems (in the case of highly decentralised countries) and when government wages are set in a homogeneous way in the country (in the case of more centralised countries). In addition, some recent evidence signals that the public-private wage premium may be related to employment protection legislation, possibly because higher compensations are needed to make public employment attractive when private employment is more strongly protected (see EC, 2014). More fundamentally, the heterogeneity of the premium may also be linked to the degree of substitutability between publicly provided goods and services and private activity.
Simple correlation analysis shows that the higher the degree of substitutability, the lower the wage premium.
Despite the rich set of theories rationalising the existence of a public pay premium, there is a limited amount of research providing cross country comparisons of public-private pay for. Unfortunately, the data available are not enough to provide a full understanding of the mechanism of sorting between the public and private sector on the basis of factors such as fringe benefi ts, job security or pension schemes. Moreover, it is also not possible to control for self selection effects determined by the unobservable characteristics of the individuals (such as preferences). Despite these drawbacks, the analysis of EU SILC data allows the identifi cation of several relevant differences between public and private sector workers. They follow the common approach of running Mincer type wage regressions taking the logarithm of gross income per hour as the dependent variable, (y). The set of covariates (X) includes binary variables denoting married status, low and high education, managerial position, part time job and female, year and region related effects, as well as experience and a second degree polynomial in experience (or age and age squared whenever information on experience is not available). The specifi cation also includes a binary variable (public) denoting that individual i works in one of the industries taken as a proxy for the public sector (Public Administration, health and education). Equation (1) clarifi es the specifi cation. private wage premium (from -13.5% in Norway to 39% in Cyprus). They also fi nd that that more than half of the cross sectional variation in wage gaps can be accounted for by variables linked to non-competitive wage settlements in the public sector, whereas different labour market institutions in the public vs. the private sector have less explanatory power. By looking at long-term trends (1970 2014) using national accounts data, they also fi nd that openness to international competition and improvements in the institutional quality of governments have been associated with decreases in the public-private wage gap.
With regard to the fi nancial crisis, a signifi cant narrowing of wage gaps has been documented across European countries, this process being mainly associated with the widespread fi scal consolidation needs, rather than structural factors such as those explaining the pay gap differences in the cross section. Non-euro area countries
